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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the unique tourism policies established by the Royal Government of Bhutan 
to control tourism in the country. The paper is conceptualized using the power relationship 
framework developed by Foucault and regionalization theory to analyze Bhutan’s tourism 
policy. The paper is based on interviews that were carried out with high-level tourism officials, 
local business owners and managers, international tourists, regional tourists, and domestic 
tourists (Buddhist pilgrims).  The number of tourists to Bhutan has been controlled not by an 
annual visa quota, but by a daily minimum tariff, required guided tour, certain spatial 
restrictions, and the general perception of inconvenience associated with the process of getting a 
visa.  The controlled tourism policy, however, is limited only to western tourists, which represent 
only a quarter of the tourists visiting the country.  Although Bhutan has been able to minimize 
the environmental and cultural impacts of western tourists through its low-volume, high-yield 
tourism policy, this is more related to power and regional politics than simply a quest for 
sustainable tourism.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How to minimize the impacts of tourism on the environment and culture and maximize 
its economic benefits has been a major topic in tourism studies over the past several years.  In 
most cases, the concept of ‘good tourism’ has been implemented on a small scale (e.g., a 
community, village, or region) (Nyaupane & Thapa, 2004).  Bhutan, a Himalayan kingdom in 
South Asia, has been implementing a low-volume, high-yield tourism policy for the whole 
country.   Bhutan has long established a minimum fee policy, which effectively curtails certain 
types of tourism, such as western low-budget, backpacker travel. With the realization that 
tourism has salient negative social and ecological impacts, Bhutan established controlled tourism 
policies early on in its development. While Bhutan is a capitalist country with a newly 
democratically elected government, its tourism policies somewhat resemble those of totalitarian 
states, such as North Korea and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. However, 
the number is controlled by a tariff, not by a visa quota, and tourists’ movements are controlled 
by guided tours. Further, this policy is implemented only for tourists from outside of South Asia 
with no tariff being levied for regional tourists, primarily Indians (Brunet, Bauer, Lacy, & 
Tshering, 2001). National tourism policies particularly for many small developing countries are 
affected by regional geopolitical relationships. Further, bilateral agreements between countries, 
which are unequal in size, population and economy, play contradictory roles in their policies 
(O’Brien, 2007).  The purpose of this study is to examine the unique tourism policies established 
by the Royal Government of Bhutan to control tourism in the country. The paper is 
conceptualized using the power relationship framework developed by Foucault and 
regionalization theory to analyze Bhutan’s tourism policy.  
There are various reasons to explain why governments intervene and exert control in 
tourism. Political reasons are very powerful, but they are subtle because governments never 
overtly release statements and information about their hidden political interests. Ideologically, 
communist countries like North Korea, China, and Cuba nationalize the means of production, 
including tourism operations.  Political reasons include nationalism and identity, foreign 
relations, and power balance. Tourism provides opportunities for many developing countries to 
be known in the world as an independent country.  Economic reasons are more overt in nature 
than political reasons. Protectionism is the most common reason, in which government protects 
the local industry by not allowing or discouraging foreign investments and ownership if the local 
tourism industry cannot compete with the international market.  Government intervention in 
tourism sometimes comes from public unhappiness and animosity when private developers do 
not care about social, environmental and economic consequences of tourism by which public 
protest or demonstrate their anger toward the industry (Elliott, 1997). Another reason for public 
sector control over tourism is based on the assumption that tourism can be managed through a 
supply driven policy and can be controlled from above (McKercher, 1999). However, in reality, 
public sector planners do not have complete control since tourism largely is a demand driven 
activity, where markets seek destinations and activities to satisfy their customers (McKercher, 
1999).   
Government takes control of the industry through constitutions, laws, formal ministries, 
departments or councils to oversee tourism development (Elliott, 1997). It is easier to control and 
collaborate with other organizations if the institution is positioned at a higher order of 
bureaucracy. The power relationship in tourism is often analyzed from a micro-level perspective 
where many planners argue the legitimacy of stakeholders’ collaboration and cooperation (Reed, 
1997). However, the power relationship in tourism is beyond the local stakeholders.  
The power relationships can be better conceptualized using a Foucauldian framework of 
power. According to Foucault (1977), power somehow inheres in institutions themselves rather 
than in the individuals that make those institutions function:  
“Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distributions of 
bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the 
relation in which individuals are caught up. The ceremonies, the rituals, the marks by 
which the sovereign’s surplus power was manifested are useless” (p. 202).   
Rulers and politicians are main players of tourism, and they often use tourism as a tool for 
gaining economic and political power, and creating a good image of the country. Many small 
developing countries use tourism to form part of their national identity. One step down the rulers 
and elite politicians, state machinery, public-sector tourism institutions such as ministries, 
departments, tourism planners and marketers exercise their power through rules, regulations, and 
codes of ethics. There is a mechanism, which Foucault (1977) calls Panopticon that automatizes 
and disindividualizes power.  Although the power of rulers and politicians is most powerful, they 
often influence from the backstage. For state machinery, independent tourists are problems 
because they may resists suggestions and planned itineraries more than guided tourists (Cheong 
and Miller, 2000).   
Foucault further distinguishes two vital elements of power relations, which are “agents,” 
who exercise power and “the other” or targets, the one over whom power is exercised (Foucault, 
1982).  “Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, 
1982, p. 221). Tourists are therefore a new “others” on whom the power can be exercised.  Based 
on Foucouldian power relations, Cheong (1996) categorized tourists as target as Foucault’s child, 
woman, criminal and patient, and tourism institutions and guides as agents. Tourists are 
classified as gargets because they are insecure, and challenged by unfamiliar political and 
cultural environment, where they have linguistic disadvantaged (Cheong and Miller, 2000). 
Through the control mechanism “they [tourism agents] influence what tourists can and cannot 
do, where they can and cannot go, and what they select or reject. Agents not only focus what to 
be seen, they also determine what is not to be seen or experiences.” (Cheong and Miller, 2000, p. 
383).   
Tourism agents want tourists to appreciate their culture and environment and to be hidden 
from many realities of everyday life in the destination, such as social problems and political 
unrest. This can be achieved by constraining tourists by space, time and staged authenticity. 
Space constraint is apparent as some regions and sites are closed for tourists. Authoritarian 
governments are often hesitant to open areas for foreign tourists because it gives access to areas 
and situations that may expose inhumane acts of autocratic leaders to the outside world.  
Authorities therefore tend to discourage or restrict tourists’ activities during demonstrations and 
protests in order to hide human rights violations. If tourists spend more time in a country, they 
are more likely to be aware of social and political problems and may also act as political 
activists.  Many modern societies rapidly institutionalizing the rights of outsiders to look into its 
people, their workings and culture, and the environment (Urry, 2002). This is done through what 
MacCannell calls ‘staged authenticity’ (1973), which is constructed not by individuals, but by 
institutions to hide their true political faces particularly, in totalitarian systems. In addition, in 
guided tours, guides orchestrate interactions with other brokers such as hotels, restaurants, and 
souvenir shops to fulfill their economic agenda (Cheong and Miller, 2000). 
Although there is an emergence of international governance to tackle some collective 
problems within borders and across borders, there are vast disparities in power influence among 
states (Thakur and Langenhove, 2007). Regionalization functions in three major roles including 
economic, security and governance. Tourism literature often ignores subnational and regional 
politics, which are important for small developing countries like Bhutan (Richter, 1989). 
Therefore, we also use regionalization theory to analyze Bhutan’s regional tourism.   
 
METHODS 
The research upon which this paper is based was carried out during the month of May 
2008, in several important tourist areas of Bhutan. Interviews were carried out with high-level 
tourism officials, local business owners and managers, international tourists, regional tourists, 
and domestic tourists (Buddhist pilgrims) at key locations in Paro, Thimpu, and Punaka, where 
over 70% of the country’s tourism activity is concentrated. The questioning was aimed at 
understanding the well-publicized (albeit inaccurate international views) of controlled tourism 
policy, and entrepreneurial challenges associated with it in the Bhutanese tourism sector, as well 
as the tourism-related relationships between Bhutan and its neighboring countries in South Asia.  
 
FINDINGS 
Contrary to popular belief, Bhutan has never had an annual visa quota to limit the number 
of incoming tourists. The number of tourists, however, was indirectly controlled by a daily 
minimum tariff, required guided tour, certain spatial restrictions, and the general perception of 
inconvenience associated with the process of getting a visa. Currently, tourists are required to 
pay a minimum daily fee of $200 USD, which includes food, accommodations, local ground 
transportation, and a personal guide. Individual travel is permitted, but each person must be 
accompanied by a certified guide. All travel is organized as a package and prepaid through 
official agents in Bhutan. Of the US$200 paid per day, the government provides 65% (US$130) 
to the industry to provide services to tourists; the government retains the rest 35% (US$70) of the 
money as a tourist tax. Despite its low-volume, high-yield principle, the Tourism Council of 
Bhutan is working to increase arrivals, including attending international trade shows, which 
contradicts its traditional policy of low-volume tourism.  
Bhutan started a high tariff ($130/ day per foreign tourist) since the beginning of tourism 
in 1974, which was raised to $200 in 1989. Table 1 summarizes the history of the tourism tariff 
system of Bhutan.  The government introduced differential rates based on activity, geography 
and season in 1994. For example, based on geography, there were three different tariff rates-- 
$220 for tourists to popular and accessible districts such as Paro, Thimpu and Phuntsoling, $150 
for visits to mid-access districts including Wangdee and Bumthang, and only $130 for remote 
districts including Phobikha, Mongar, and Tashigang. Although the royal government of Bhutan 
recently increased the tariff to $250 from $200, the government temporarily reduced the rate to 
$200 to minimize the impact of the current economic downturn and its consequences on tourist 
arrivals (Tourism Council of Bhutan, 2009). Effective July 2009, the royal government of 
Bhutan announced $20 and $15 discount per night on the royalty for the tourists staying more 
than eight nights during the peak months and shoulder season (January, June and July), 
respectively.   
Government officials claim that unrestricted tourism can have severe consequences on 
the country’s environment and rich and unique culture, and therefore the royal government of 
Bhutan has adopted high-value, low-volume tourism since the beginning.  The small number is 
justified for sustainability and the lack of infrastructure: 
 “The tourism industry in Bhutan is founded on the principle of sustainability, 
meaning that tourism must be environmentally and ecologically friendly, socially 
and culturally acceptable and economically viable. The number of tourists visiting 
Bhutan is regulated to a manageable level because of the lack of infrastructure 
also.” (Bhutan Tourism Council, 2009, p. 1).  
Because of the fewer but higher-income tourists, there is not much demand of casinos and 
nightclubs, although new nightclubs have been opened in Thimpu for local youth. It is always 
argued that Bhutanese tourism is easily controlled by the government because of its small scale. 
If arrivals and volume increase, tourism would be harder to control (Richter, 1989).  
Bhutan is a relatively newly opened country for foreign tourists and has not had much 
exposure to the rest of the world.  Despite India’s desire not to allow Bhutan to open for 
foreigners, the Royal government of Bhutan opened the country with many restrictions to declare 
to the world Bhutan’s independence. Bhutan’s decision to open the country to foreigners 
coincided with the Indian invasion of Sikkim in 1973. Both Sikkim and Bhutan were similar with 
respect to geopolitical situations. By opening the country, the monarchy thought that they would 
gain greater independence and distinction from India (Richter, 1989).  However, the royal 
government of Bhutan did not want to open the country for all foreigners. The restrictions were 
enacted primarily for political reasons, as the monarchy wanted to protect its popularity among 
the public and autocratic control by not exposing the population to a democratic system or the 
outside world.  Further, as Richter (1989) noted, “Bhutan’s tourism was limited less by Bhutan’s 
goals than by the fact that India will not approve any more permits to Bhutan” (p. 176).  Despite 
the regional politics, the number of foreign tourists visiting Bhutan has increased from 287 
(Dorji, 2001) in 1974 to over 21,000 in 2007 (Bhutan Tourism Council, 2009). By 1992 tourism 
receipts accounted for 15 to 20% of the total of the country’s exported goods and services. In 
2007, Bhutan was able to generate a substantial amount of revenue -- $10 million (Gurung and 
Seeland, 2008). Although these figures are small by global standards, tourism has had an 
enormous economic impact on this tiny Himalayan kingdom.   
The industry was operated by the government initially until 1983. From 1983 to 1991, 
tourism was operated as a quasi-autonomous and self-financed body known as the Bhutan 
Tourism Corporation (BTC) (Dorji, 2001). In 1991, the tourism industry of Bhutan was 
privatized and the government established a regulatory body, known as the Tourism Authority of 
Bhutan (TAB) to ensure the compliance of tourism regulations and to implement tourism 
policies (Dorji, 2001). The TAB was further changed into the Department of Tourism under the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. More recently, in 2008, realizing the importance of multi-
sectoral involvement of tourism development, the Department of Tourism was renamed the 
Tourism Council of Bhutan and placed under the administration of the Prime Minister (Tourism 
Council of Bhutan, 2009). The Council provides more authority to develop and manage tourism 
with the coordination of other government ministries and departments. Despite the privatization 
and other institutional changes over the years, tourism development is still largely controlled by 
the state (Gurung and Seeland, 2008).  Evolution of tourism institutions is an evidence of the 
control mechanism Bhutan is adapting.  Since the beginning, the royal family has a strong 
interest and considerable investment in tourism. As a result, tourism frequently gets a priority 
over other industries. Tourism is often considered the king’s pet project in Bhutan. Collaboration 
can potentially overcome power imbalances by involving all tourism stakeholders (Reed, 1997), 
which is actively imposed by a new western power in Bhutan through INGOs particularly SNV 
and UN organizations. However, as Jamal and Getz (1995) argued, power imbalances issues 
related to the stakeholders is inhibiting the initiation and success of collaboration in Bhutan. 
Consulting companies and INGOs tend to be working under the Foucauldian agent of power 
without challenging the authority. 
Despite the low-volume, high-yield tourism policy, Bhutan is experiencing some 
environmental and cultural impacts like other mountain destinations. Some of the noted impacts 
include the destruction of alpine vegetation for firewood, erosion due the use of horses and yaks 
during the trekking season, and increasing garbage problems along the trails (Dorji, 2001). 
Although the royal government promotes low-volume, high-yield tourism via the daily tariff, 
increasing competition among tourism operators within the country and competition with other 
mountain destinations have resulted some adverse consequences. For example, tour operators are 
providing discounts and rebates to foreign operators to compete with others (Dorji, 2001). 
Table 1 History of Tourism Tariff System 
 
Date 
 
Type of change 
Culture  
(price in US$) 
Trekking  
(price in US$) 
High season Low season High season Low season 
1974 Opening of the country for foreigners  
Tariff $130/person/night flat rate 
130 130 130 130 
1986 Tariff differentiation based on seasonality 130 90 85-130 85-130 
1989 Tariff raised to US$200 flat rate 200    
July1994 
* 
Differentiation by region and activity: 
1. Thimpu, Paro, Phuntsholing: 
2. Wangde Phodrang, Punakha, Tongsa, Bumthang and 
Samdrup Jongkhar: 
3. Phobjikha, Mongar, Tashigang, Tashi Yangtse and 
Lhuntshi: 
4. Trekking: 
 
220 
150 
 
130 
 
130-175 
100-130 
 
90-120   
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
  
 
 
 
 
80-100 
July 1995 
** 
Simplification of existing rules; amendments to 
discounts and surcharges 
 
200 
 
200 
 
120 
 
120 
Jan. 1997 Levelling of fee 200 200 200 200 
Jan. 1999 
*** 
Re-introduction of low-season pricing; amendments to 
discounts and surcharges 
 
200 
 
165 
 
200 
 
165 
Jan. 2001 
**** 
Amendments to surcharges and introduction of the 
Tourism Development Fund 
200 165 200 165 
2008 Tariff raised  250  250  
Jan 2009 Tariff temporarily reduced 200    
  
Source: Pricing Report, SNV, 2002; Bhutan Tourism Council, 2009.   
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The effectiveness of controlled tourism depends on how the government controls and 
monitors the private sector to ensure that their practices are environmentally and culturally 
sustainable. However, there is a lack of transparency, integrity and accountability within the 
government in developing countries, which is even more apparent in Bhutan. When the 
government officials have too much power, particularly in developing countries, authorities use 
their powers to favor some businesses over others for supporting relatives or for money.  
Because of the controlled tourism policy, tourism is mostly concentrated in a few urban areas in 
western Bhutan, and there is relatively little economic benefit from tourism to rural communities 
(Gurung and Seeland, 2008). Contrary to Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness index and poverty 
reduction through tourism, only few of the benefits of tourism have been distributed to rural 
communities.  
One of the most unique aspects of Bhutan’s policies is its cross-border relations with 
neighboring countries. As a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), Bhutan is part of a multilateral trade agreement with India, Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and the Maldives. Indians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and 
Maldivians are permitted to travel to Bhutan visa-free, and they are permitted to use their own 
vehicles. This has resulted in increasing numbers of Indian tourists to Bhutan. In 2005, Bhutan 
received over 60,000 Indian tourists, which is more than four times more than all other 
international arrivals combined in the same year (Department of Tourism, 2006). Despite 
Bhutan’s attempt to control tourism through a tariff, there is no tariff or visa requirement for 
Indians. Tourism entrepreneurs reported that the costs of accommodation and food established 
by the government do not apply to Indian tourists. Therefore, hotels compete with each other and 
reduce prices to attract this group of tourists; Indian visitors are aware of this competition, and 
constantly attempt to negotiate lower food and lodging rates. Tourism business owners 
acknowledge the importance of Indian tourists because hotels and restaurants cannot solely rely 
on general foreign tourists. Many business people in Bhutan believe that without Indian guests, 
the industry could hardly survive on such small numbers of international arrivals.  This clearly 
reflects the fact that Bhutan’s low-volume, high-yield tourism policy is somewhat contradictory. 
Bhutan’s tourism has been further complicated by its relationship with neighboring countries. 
Other members of SAARC, however, such as Nepalese, Afghanis and Pakistanis are required to 
obtain a visa ahead of time. This policy has resulted in very few arrivals from Nepal, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In the early 1990s, over 100,000 Bhutanese citizens of Nepali origin 
were expelled when Bhutan implemented a one-culture policy. Currently, some of these refugees 
are being resettled in the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the UK, and Norway. This has 
troubled the relationship between Nepal and Bhutan. On the other hand, there is a strong Indian 
presence in Bhutan through bilateral agreements because of its border situation with China. 
There are more Indian Army troops (19,000) in Bhutan than there are Royal Bhutanese Army 
troops (18,000).  
Other consequences of this policy include Bhutan’s receiving a very low percentage of 
repeat visitors. Only 13% of tourists are repeat visitors; the rest (87%) are first-timers 
(Department of Tourism, 2006). While many in Bhutan’s administration believe that guided and 
controlled tourism results in fewer environmental and social impacts by controlling sites and 
tourists’ activities, it prevents many visitors from experiencing what they are looking for, 
resulting in many dissatisfied tourists. From a consumer perspective, this prohibits new product 
development processes, which are essential for new tourism destinations.  Since the government 
dictates room and meal rates, there is also a lack of competition for quality. This may have a 
long-term impact on the quality of tourism services as the country has to compete with similar 
destinations in other Himalayan destinations, such as Nepal, Tibet, and Northern India.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Bhutan has been able to minimize the environmental and cultural impacts of western 
tourists through its low-volume, high-yield tourism policy. However, this policy is limited only 
to western tourists, while the impacts of a growing number of regional tourists on the 
environment and culture is ignored. This paper therefore argues that Bhutan’s tourism policy is 
more influenced by power and regionalization. Regulation of only western tourists may not bring 
the outcome Bhutan is trying to achieve. Bhutan’s low-volume, high-yield policy will not be 
effective if it is implemented only to western tourists and ignores high-volume, low-yield 
regional tourism.  Bhutan’s tourism failed to incorporate the role of the free market in developing 
tourism products and destinations. The question is how long the government can dictate the 
market in the global economy. There is a need to liberalize the industry to some extent so that it 
will move in a positive direction.  
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